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THE YOUNG REPORT: AN AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
ON THE LATEST RESPONSE TO BRITAIN’S
‘COMPENSATION CULTURE’

JAMES GOUDKAMP*

This article addresses the Young Report, which is an important recent
response to Britain’s putative ‘compensation culture’. This Report is
examined with reference to the far-reaching reforms of tort law that
occurred in Australia at the start of the twenty-first century. The analysis
reveals that while there are certain similarities in the way in which tort law
has been reformed in Australia and Britain, the reforms have ultimately
unfolded quite differently in these jurisdictions. The main difference is that
attention in Britain has centred on the system of procedure by which tort law
is administered whereas in Australia the focus has been on the substantive
law, including the law governing the assessment of damages. A possible
reason for this divergence has to do with differences in political ideology.
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I INTRODUCTION

In Britain, as in several other countries, the law of torts is predominantly judge-made.1 For
example, most of tort law’s central principles, such as those concerning the duty of care, the
standard of the reasonable person, and the concepts of damage and remoteness, are found in
the law reports rather than in the statute books. This sets tort law aside from many other
fields. Of course, this is not to say that tort law has not been touched by legislation. In the
‘age of statutes’2 in which we live, legislative alteration of tort law is ubiquitous. For instance,
important statutory provisions apply in relation to occupiers’ liability,3 liability for animals,4
contributory negligence,5 and fatal accidents.6 Legislation has also made significant changes
to the procedure by which tort law is administered. However, these statutory modifications do
not, for the most part, relate to foundational doctrines of the law of torts. In other words, they
have impacted upon hamlets and villages rather than metropolises or the polity as a whole.
In some other jurisdictions, the experience has been quite different, and legislation has
affected a major shift away from basic common law principles. Such a shift occurred in
Australia at the start of the twenty-first century. Between 2002 and 2004, the governments of
all Australian States and Territories7 enacted statutes that radically altered the tort system.8
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Stephen Sugarman writes that ‘tort remains, of all the law school courses we offer, the queen of the common
law subjects’ (S Sugarman, ‘Assumption of Risk’ (1997) 31 Val UL Rev 833 at 833 n 1).
G Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of the Statutes (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1982).
Occupiers Liability Act 1957 (UK); Occupiers Liability Act 1984 (UK).
Animals Act 1971 (UK).
Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 (UK).
Fatal Accidents Act 1976 (UK); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1934 (UK).
In Australia, the States and Territories have primary responsibility in constitutional terms for the law of tort.
The Federal Government can only legislate with respect to tort law in so far as doing so falls within a specific
list of powers granted to it under the Australian Constitution.
The principal pieces of legislation are as follows: Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW); Civil Liability Act 2003
(Qld); Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld); Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA) (as amended by the
Wrongs (Liability and Damages for Personal Injury) Amendment Act 2002 (SA) and the Law Reform
(Ipp Recommendations) Act 2004 (SA)); Recreational Services (Limitation of Liability) Act 2002 (SA);
Volunteers Protection Act 2001 (SA); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) (as amended by
the Wrongs and Other Acts (Public Liability Insurance Reform) Act 2002 (Vic), the Wrongs and Other Acts
(Law of Negligence) Act 2003 (Vic) and the Wrongs and Limitation of Actions Acts (Insurance Reform)
Act 2003 (Vic)); Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA); Volunteers and Food and Other Donors (Protection from
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This flurry of legislative activity was motivated primarily by a desire to rein in insurance
premiums, which had increased dramatically. As a result of these reforms,9 tort law is no
longer primarily a creation of the common law. Its contours are now at least as much a
product of statutory provisions as rules that have their origin in the common law.
When the Bill that became the Compensation Act 2006 (UK) was debated, it was
tentatively suggested that provisions modelled on the Australian statutes should be introduced
into it.10 However, this half-hearted proposal did not come to fruition. While the
Compensation Act made certain adjustments to the law of torts,11 it did not go nearly as far as
the Australian statutes. Pressure for further reform of tort law in Britain diminished following
the enactment of the Compensation Act. There was a period of relative (or, merciful, some
might say) quiet. However, this lull was short-lived. In 2009 the tort system caught the
interest of the Conservatives, who were then in opposition. The Rt David Cameron MP asked
his adviser on health and safety, the Rt Hon the Lord Young of Graffham PC, to report on the
‘compensation culture’, which the Conservatives thought had been inadequately addressed by
the Compensation Act, and to suggest ways of remedying it. Lord Young published his report,
which has become known as the ‘Young Report’, in October 2010.12 The Young Report is not
exclusively concerned with the tort system. Much of it addresses occupational health and
safety laws. Nevertheless, certain of its recommendations are of considerable interest to tort
scholars.

9
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Liability) Act 2002 (WA); Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT); Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages)
Act 2003 (NT); Personal Injuries (Civil Claims) Act 2003 (NT).
The word ‘reform’ sometimes implies a change for the better. I do not intend to convey this meaning when I
use it in this article. By law ‘reform’, I mean any change in the law, positive or detrimental.
See, e.g., HL Hansard, 20 Dec 2005, col GC258-271.
For a useful discussion of the Act see A Morris, ‘The “Compensation Culture”’ in TT Arvind and J Steele
(eds), Tort Law and the Legislature (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 15 (forthcoming). See also the
discussion of the Bill that became the Act in K Williams, ‘Legislating in the Echo Chamber?’ (2005) 155
NLJ 1938.
Lord Young, Common Sense, Common Safety (London: HM Government, 2010). The Report is available
online: <http://www.number10.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/402906_CommonSense_acc.pdf>.
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This article offers an analysis of those parts of the Young Report that relate to tort law,
including the procedure by which tort law is administered (which tort lawyers cannot afford to
ignore).13 It does so in the light of the Australian reforms that have been mentioned.
Assessing the Young Report from this perspective is illuminating for at least two reasons.
First, it was seemingly influenced by events in Australia14 (although this was not
acknowledged in it). Secondly, it reveals that the reform experiences in Britain and Australia
have been quite different. Whereas the focus of the Australian legislatures has been on the
substantive law of torts, including the law governing the assessment of damages, in Britain
the concern has been primarily with the procedural regime by which tort law is governed (a
trend continued by the Young Report). The waters of the substantive law of torts in Britain, as
has been noted, are relatively unpolluted by statutory intervention. This difference, which has
so far been overlooked by theorists, is noteworthy considering the similarity of the British
legal system to that of Australia. It is a difference that calls for explanation.

II TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY TORT REFORM IN AUSTRALIA: AN OUTLINE

(A)

The 2001-2002 Insurance Crisis

One of the most important issues in domestic politics in Australia at the start of the twentyfirst century was an ‘insurance crisis’. During 2001-2002, premiums for third-party insurance
increased sharply, sometimes by several hundred per cent. These hikes, which were
particularly pronounced in relation to medical indemnity and public liability insurance, had a
profound impact on many facets of Australian society. Insurance became unaffordable for
13

14

It builds on a valuable analysis of the Report by Annette Morris, ‘“Common Sense Common Safety”: the
Compensation Culture Perspective’ (2011) 27 PN 82.
That Lord Young was cognisant of the Australian reforms is evident from the language he used in his Report.
Certain turns of phrase found in the Australian legislation appear in the Young Report with sufficient
regularity to exclude the possibility that their presence is a coincidence.
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many or unavailable. Businesses were wound up.15 Social clubs closed.16 Children’s
playgrounds and sports fields were cordoned off.17 Stretches of road were shut. Charitable
events were cancelled. Medical practitioners, especially those working in the ‘high risk’ fields
of obstetrics and neurosurgery, retired prematurely or threatened to do so (which had severe
consequences for parts of rural Australia, where medical services were, and still are, in short
supply).18 Even ANZAC Day (a national day of remembrance) commemorations19 and
Christmas carols20 were jeopardised. Politicians quickly realised that something significant
had to be done (and be seen to be done) to address this situation.

(B)

The Law of Torts Blamed

The law of torts was widely blamed as the (or the main) cause of the insurance crisis. It
quickly became intensely politicised as a result. The media enthusiastically condemned the
system by parodying it and the judges who administered it.21 The public was inundated with
of ‘horror stories’ (which were sometimes not even from Australia) that supposedly proved
the litigiousness of Australians, their reluctance to accept ‘personal responsibility’ for their
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‘Businesses Under Pressure’, 28 March 2002, Canberra Times, 2; D Buttler and N Webber, ‘State of
Despair: Insurance Crisis Costs Jobs, Festivals, Fun’, 27 June 2002, Herald Sun, 1.
G Jacobsen, ‘Clubs, Charities Crippled as Premiums Soar’, 31 October 2001, Sydney Morning Herald, 3.
‘Field of Broken Dreams: Liability Bowls out Cricket Ground’, 12 August 2002, Daily Telegraph, 9.
G Healy and S Stock, ‘Insurance is Ruining Us, Warn Doctors’, 4 December 2000, The Australian, 6.
L Morris, ‘Liability Crisis has Light Horsemen Galloping for Cover’, 30 August 2002, Sydney Morning
Herald, 6.
‘Insurance Crisis Kills Santa’, 29 August 2002, Daily Telegraph, 19; F Walker, ‘HIH Insurance Crisis
Cancels Christmas’, 9 December 2001, Herald Sun, 18.
Analyses of the warped picture that the Australian media painted of tort law are provided in K Burns,
‘Distorting the Law: Politics, Media and the Litigation Crisis: An Australian Perspective’ (2007) 15 TLJ 195
and D Howard-Wagner, ‘Who are the Real “Heroes” and “Villains”: The Print Media’s Role in Constructing
the “Public Liability Crisis” as a “Moral Panic Drama”’ (2006) 10 Newcastle L Rev 69.
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conduct, the insatiable greed of lawyers, and that the tort system generally was
dysfunctional.22
Skirmishes between politicians, who widely believed the tort system to be responsible not
only for the insurance crisis but for a litany of other problems in Australia, and claimant
lawyers were regularly fought on television and radio shows, often at prime-time. Insurers,
who organised themselves into a powerful lobby group, clamoured for change.23 Even judges
weighed into the debate. For instance, at the height of the crisis the Chief Justice of
New South Wales published a seminal article in which he argued that tort law was slanted too
far in favour of claimants.24 His Honour called for ‘principles-based reform’ of tort law.
The legal profession vigorously disputed the suggestion that tort law had contributed
materially to the insurance crisis.25 Associations representing the profession observed that
there was no reliable evidence to warrant laying responsibility for the premium rises at tort
law’s door.26 It was also pointed out that there had not been any recent developments in the
law of torts that significantly increased insurers’ exposure. The ‘stretching’ of tort law in
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A case on which the media focused was Swain v Waverley Municipal Council. The claimant in this litigation
had been catastrophically injured when he dived under a wave at a beach for which the defendant Council
was responsible and struck his head on a sandbank. A jury (a rarity in civil actions in Australia) held the
defendant liable in negligence. A majority of the New South Wales Court of Appeal set aside the jury’s
verdict and entered judgment for the defendant: Waverley Municipal Council v Swain [2003] NSWCA 61;
[2003] Aust Torts Rep 81-694. The claimant successfully appealed to the High Court of Australia:
Swain v Waverley Municipal Council [2005] HCA 4; (2005) 220 CLR 517.
See, for example, the following short article written by a senior representative of the insurance industry: A
Mason, ‘Reform of the Law of Negligence: Balancing Costs and Community Expectations’ (2002) 25
UNSWLJ 831.
JJ Spigelman, ‘Negligence: The Last Outpost of the Welfare State’ (2002) 76 ALJ 432. See also
JJ Spigelman, ‘Negligence and Insurance Premiums: Recent Changes in Australia Law’ (2003) 11 TLJ 291;
JJ Spigelman, ‘Tort Law Reform: An Overview’ (2006) 14 Tort L Rev 5.
The views of the profession were expressed primarily via an association then known as the Australian
Plaintiff Lawyers Association (‘APLA’) (it is now known as the Australian Lawyers Alliance). APLA
contended that the premium hikes were due to a multitude of factors that were unrelated to the tort system,
including the collapse of two major insurers, HIH and United Medical Protection Ltd, instability in the global
financial markets following the terrorist attacks against the United States on 11 September 2001, the rising
cost of reinsurance, and the aggressive under-pricing of risks due to an overly competitive domestic
insurance market.
APLA, Inquiry to Review of the Law of Negligence: APLA Legal and Policy Submission (2002) at 18,
<http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/subs/042Plaintiff.pdf>. See also Law Council of Australia,
Submission by the Law Council of Australia to the Negligence Review Panel on the Review of the Law of
Negligence (2002) at 3-4, <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/subs/033LCA3.pdf>.
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Australia in favour of claimants, to use Professor Patrick Atiyah’s graphic phrase,27 had well
and truly ceased by the start of the twenty-first century. Indeed, the High Court of Australia
had been developing tort law in a decidedly pro-defendant fashion since approximately
1999.28 Claimants had lost in a string of cases in that Court in the period leading up to the
insurance crisis.29 In short, the view of the legal profession generally was that reform of tort
law was unnecessary.

(C)

A Panel of Eminent Persons Convened

In a rare display of unity, the governments of Australia co-operated to address the insurance
crisis. They commissioned a Panel (known as the ‘Panel of Eminent Persons’) to advise them
how to reform the tort of negligence in the context of actions for damages for personal injury
and death. The Panel’s terms of reference required it to assume that ‘[t]he award of damages
for personal injury ha[d] become unaffordable and unsustainable as the principal source of
compensation for those injured through the fault of another.’30 The Panel was asked to
proceed on the footing that it was ‘desirable to examine a method for the reform of the
common law with the objective of limiting liability and [sic] quantum of damages arising
from personal injury and death.’31 Controversially, the Panel was not given a brief to consider
whether tort law was causally related to the spike in insurance premiums.
The Panel was chaired by the Hon Justice David Ipp AO, who was then an Acting Justice
of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales (an intermediate appellate

27
28
29

30

31

PS Atiyah, The Damages Lottery (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1997).
APLA, above n 26 at 16-18.
This judicial reversal of the fortunes of claimants is described in H Luntz, ‘Torts Turnaround Downunder’
(2001) 1 OUCLJ 95.
Ministerial Communiqué, Terms of Reference: Principles Based Review of the Law of Negligence
by a Panel of Eminent Persons <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/termsofref.asp>.
Ibid.
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court in Australia). Its other members were Professor Peter Cane,32 a medical practitioner, and
the mayor of a local council. The Panel was answerable to the Federal Minister for Revenue
and Assistant Treasurer (the Hon Senator Helen Coonan MP) and based in, and serviced by,
the Federal Treasury Department. Both its institutional link with the Federal Government and
its composition sent strong messages. The Panel’s close tie with the Federal Government
suggested that its role was to advise the Federal Government how to implement its stated
policy, which was clearly articulated in the terms of reference, rather than to recommend how
the law might be changed for the better, all things considered. Furthermore, the fact that the
Panel was responsible not to the Federal Attorney-General but to a Treasury minister
underscored the political perception that priority should be given to economic considerations
rather than to broader concerns of justice. The composition of the Panel also reflected the
prevailing political climate. The appointment of lay persons to it indicated a belief on the part
of the legislatures that the Panel’s report should be suffused with community views. The fact
that the lay members were representatives of the medical profession and local authorities
suggested that the interests of these stakeholders (both of which had been severely affected by
the insurance premium increases) should be given particular weight.33 These features of the
Panel rendered it quite a different entity from a law reform commission.

(D) The Ipp Report

Because of the calamitous consequences that the insurance crisis was having for Australian
society, the Panel was forced to work under severe time restraints. Its terms of reference were

32

33

Peter Cane wrote an article about the Panel’s role in the reform process: P Cane, ‘Reforming Tort Law in
Australia: A Personal Perspective’ (2003) 27 MULR 649.
Senator Coonan, announcing the Panel, said that the appointment to the Panel of the lay members would
‘ensure that the views of medical practitioners and community organisations are fully taken into account’
(Treasury of the Commonwealth of Australia, Minister Announces Review Panel (2002),
<http://assistant.treasurer.gov.au/DisplayDocs.aspx?pageID=&doc=pressreleases/2002/076.htm&min=hlc>).
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issued on 2 July 2002.34 Following a consultation exercise, the Panel, as instructed, published
its Interim Report on 30 August 200235 and its Final Report, which became known as the
‘Ipp Report’, on 30 September 2002.36 The Ipp Report is 255 pages in length and contains
61 recommendations. It is written in a scholarly style, although, understandably, it avoids
getting draw into theoretical debates. All in all, it was a remarkable achievement. This is
especially so given the brief period within which the Panel had to report to their political
masters and the fact that the workload must have fallen primarily on its two legally-trained
members.
It is impractical and unnecessary to discuss the Panel’s recommendations in detail.
However, it is convenient to briefly mention a selection of its proposals that are likely to be of
particular interest to a British audience or which are essential to note in order to understand
the Australian tort reform process. The Panel’s recommendations included the following:


Legislation resulting from its recommendations should be uniform across
Australia.37



Legislation should provide that, in determining whether the reasonable person in
the defendant’s position would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, it is
relevant to consider (among other things): (i) the probability that the harm would
occur if care was not taken; (ii) the likely seriousness of the harm if it occurred;
(iii) the burden of taking precautions to avoid or reduce the risk of harm; and
(iv) the social utility of the risk-creating activity.38

34
35

36

37
38

Ibid.
Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Interim Report (2002) The Interim Report is
available online: <http://revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report/PDF/LawNegFull.pdf>.
Commonwealth of Australia, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002). The Ipp Report
incorporated
the
Interim
Report.
It
is
available
online:
<http://www.revofneg.treasury.gov.au/content/Report2/PDF/Law_Neg_Final.pdf>.
Ipp Report, Recommendation 1.
Ipp Report, Recommendation 28(d). In making this recommendation, the Panel did not intend to change the
common law. The four factors that it identified as being relevant to whether the defendant acted negligently
are criteria that the common law regards as material: see Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12;
(1980) 146 CLR 40. Rather the Panel’s hope was that, by reducing these factors to a statutory formula,
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The Bolam39 test should be adopted in medical malpractice cases in which the
allegation of negligence relates to treatment (as opposed to a failure to inform the
claimant of risks of injury).40 (The Bolam test had been rejected by the High Court
of Australia in Rogers v Whitaker.41 In that case, the High Court held that the
ordinary rules concerning the standard of care applied in professional negligence
cases.)



The immunity of highway authorities for non-feasance (which the High Court
abolished in 2001,42 much to the dismay of politicians) should not be restored.43



Providers of ‘recreational services’ should be given immunity in respect of
liability resulting from the materialisation of an ‘obvious risk’ of injury in their
services.44



The common law regarding the liability of not-for-profit organisations should not
be changed.45 Nor should any adjustment be made to the law concerning
Good Samaritans.



Legislation should authorise findings of 100 per cent contributory negligence.46
(The High Court of Australia had held that findings of contributory negligence
were impermissible.47)



Only those claimants who are ‘15 per cent of a most extreme case’ should be
entitled to general damages.48

39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48

judges would be more likely to pay closer attention to factors that militate against finding that the defendant
acted unreasonably: Ipp Report at 106 [7.17].
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (CA); [1957] 2 All ER 118.
Ipp Report, Recommendation 3.
[1992] HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479.
Brodie v Singleton Shire Council [2001] HCA 29; (2001) 206 CLR 512.
Ipp Report at 152 [10.5].
Ipp Report, Recommendation 11.
Ipp Report, Recommendations 10 and 16.
Ipp Report, Recommendation 31.
Wynbergen v Hoyts Corp Pty Ltd [1997] HCA 52; (1997) 72 ALJR 65.
Ipp Report, Recommendation 47.
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Damages for a loss of earnings per week should be capped at twice average fulltime adult ordinary time weekly earnings in Australia49 (at the date the Ipp Report
was published, this proposal would have resulted in a cap of AUD$1744.8050
(roughly £1130)).



The discount rate applicable to damages for future economic loss should be
three per cent.51 (This is the Australian common law rate.52 In most Australian
jurisdictions, a higher rate, usually five per cent, had been set in many contexts.)



(E)

Exemplary and aggravated damages should be abolished.53

The Legislative Reaction54

It is a notorious fact that recommendations for the reform of the law frequently fall on deaf
ears.55 This was not the case with respect to the proposals for change contained in the
Ipp Report. In some jurisdictions, such as New South Wales and Queensland, many of its
recommendations were swiftly enacted,56 essentially verbatim. The legislatures in other

49
50

51
52
53
54

55

56

Ipp Report, Recommendation 49.
Australian Bureau of Statistics, Average Weekly Earnings Australia, Table 3: Average Weekly Earnings,
Australian (Dollars) – Original (Reference 6302.0).
Ipp Report, Recommendation 53.
Todorovic v Waller [1981] HCA 72; (1981) 150 CLR 402.
Ipp Report, Recommendation 60.
Numerous articles discuss the legislation enacted in the wake of the Ipp Report. For a small sampling see
DA Ipp, ‘Negligence –– Where Lies the Future?’ (2003) 23 ABR 158; Spigelman (2003), above n 24;
Spigelman (2006), above n 24; B McDonald, ‘Legislative Intervention in the Law of Negligence: The
Common Law, Statutory Interpretation and Tort Reform in Australia’ (2005) 27 Syd LR 443; B McDonald,
‘The Impact of the Civil Liability Legislation on Fundamental Policies and Principles of the Common Law of
Negligence’ (2006) 14 TLJ 268; J Keeler, ‘Personal Responsibility and the Reform Recommended by the Ipp
Report: “Time Future Contained in Time Past”’ (2006) 14 TLJ 48.
The Law Commission Act 2009 (UK), which amends the Law Commission Act 1965 (UK), attempts to rectify
this situation. It requires the Lord Chancellor to report to Parliament annually on the extent to which the Law
Commission’s proposals have been implemented: see Law Commission Act 1965 (UK), s 3A. See also the
Protocol between the Lord Chancellor and the Law Commission agreed pursuant to s 3B(1): Law
Commission, Protocol Between the Lord Chancellor (on Behalf of the Government) and the Law
Commission, Report 321 (London: The Stationery Office, 2010) at 6 [18]-[22]. This Protocol relevantly
requires the government to correspond with the Commission following the publication of a report regarding
its implementation.
Indeed, the governments in some jurisdictions did not wait for the Ipp Report to be published.
Controversially, the New South Wales government began its reform process before the Ipp Panel had been
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jurisdictions, such as the Territories, were more discriminating and only implemented a
handful of the Ipp Report’s recommendations.
All of the legislatures enacted provisions to address issues that were not discussed in the
Ipp Report. For example, in all States and Territories save for Victoria and Western Australia,
potent illegality defences were enacted.57 These defences were created in response to a
misguided belief that the common law routinely enables persons injured while committing a
criminal offence to profit from their wrongdoing.58 The case for creating them was not
considered in the Ipp Report. Likewise, in New South Wales,59 Queensland,60
Western Australia61 and the Northern Territory,62 provisions restricting or prohibiting lawyers
from advertising personal injury services were introduced.63 Again, these controls were
created without the benefit of advice from the Ipp Panel.

57

58

59
60
61
62
63

convened. The Civil Liability Bill 2002 (NSW) was read for the first time on 28 May 2002 (the Federal
Government did not announce the composition of the Panel until 2 July 2002: Part II(C)).
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), ss 54-54A; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 45; Civil Liability Act 1936
(SA), s 43; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 94; Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003
(NT), s 10. No equivalent provision exists in Victoria or Western Australia. However, s 14G(2) of the
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) provides: ‘In determining whether the plaintiff has established a breach of the duty of
care owed by the defendant, the court must consider … whether the plaintiff was engaged in an illegal
activity.’ This provision does not create a defence in the strict sense. Rather, the claimant’s illegal act is
merely a consideration to be borne in mind for the purposes of the negligence ‘calculus’.
The political focus was on a decision of the District Court of New South Wales (Fox v Peakhurst Inn Pty Ltd
(unreported, District Court of New South Wales, McGuire DCJ, 29 August 2002)) to award nearly
AUD$50,000 (roughly £33,000) to an inebriated teenager who had been badly beaten by an occupier with a
metal bar. This beating occurred when the teenager, having been denied entry into a night club because he
was intoxicated and under-age, endeavoured to locate alternative access to the club via the occupier’s
adjoining premises. The teenager’s mother recovered AUD$18,578 (approximately £12,000) in respect of a
psychiatric injury that she suffered upon seeing her son in hospital. This decision was set aside by New South
Wales Court of Appeal on procedural grounds: Fox v Peakhurst Inn Pty Ltd [2004] NSWCA 74. The
defendant apparently lost on the retrial: V Goldner, ‘Drunk Youth gets Payout Back’, 18 December 2004,
Daily Telegraph, 26. I provided a review of the statutory illegality defences in J Goudkamp, ‘A Revival of
the Doctrine of Attainder? The Statutory Illegality Defences to Liability in Tort’ (2007) 29 Syd LR 445. See
also J Goudkamp, ‘Self-Defence and Illegality Under the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW)’ (2010) 18 TLJ 61.
Legal Profession Act 2004 (NSW), s 85(1)(d); Legal Profession Regulations 2005 (NSW), Pt 5, Div 2.
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), ss 64-66.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 16-18.
Legal Profession Act 2006 (NT), ss 288-291.
The constitutional validity of the New South Wales restrictions were tested in the High Court of Australia:
APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner [2005] HCA 44; (2005) 224 CLR 322. The main argument in
support of the suggested invalidity of the restrictions was that they infringed the implied constitutional
freedom to communication on political and governmental matters (which had been recognised by the High
Court in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 117 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television
Pty Ltd v Commonwealth [1992] HCA 45; (1992) 117 CLR 106). A majority of the Court upheld the
restrictions.
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Not only did all State and Territory legislatures engage in legislative experimentation, but
they positively disregarded certain of the Panel’s recommendations. Consider the following
four examples. First, and most notably, they ignored the Panel’s eminently sensible
recommendation that any legislation enacted to address the insurance crisis should be
consistent across Australia. Unfortunately, there are significant variations in the legislation
between jurisdictions.64 Secondly, contrary to the Panel’s advice, in all jurisdictions certain
not-for-profit organisations (or ‘volunteers’) were provided ‘good faith’ defences65 and ‘Good
Samaritans’ with immunity.66 Thirdly, in all jurisdictions except for the Northern Territory,
the immunity of highway authorities was resurrected in modified form.67 The Panel expressly
counselled against reviving the immunity.68 Finally, the advice in the Ipp Report with respect
to the discount rate was ignored by all of the legislatures other than that of the Australian
Capital Territory. A rate of five per cent was generally adopted.69 In the Australian Capital
Territory, the common law rate of three per cent70 already applied. This was left undisturbed.
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70

The extent of the discrepancies is surveyed in D Butler, ‘A Comparison of the Adoption of the Ipp Report
Recommendations and Other Personal Injuries Liability Reforms’ (2005) 13 TLJ 201.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 61; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 39; Volunteers Protection Act
2001 (SA), s 4; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas); s 47; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 37; Volunteers and Food and
Other Donors (Protection from Liability) Act 2002 (WA), s 6; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 8;
Personal Injuries (Liability and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 7. See generally M McGregor-Lowndes and
L Nguyen, ‘Volunteers and the New Tort Law Reform’ (2005) 13 TLJ 1.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), Pt 8; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), ss 25-27; Civil Liability
Act 2003 (SA), s 74; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss 35A-35C; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 31A-31C; Civil
Liability Act 2002 (WA), ss 5AB-5AE; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 5; Personal Injuries
(Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 8.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 45; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 37; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 42;
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 42; Road Management Act 2004 (Vic), s 102; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA),
s 5Z; Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 113.
See above the text accompanying n 43.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 14 (five per cent); Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 57 (five per cent); Civil
Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 3, 55 (five per cent); Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 28A (five per cent); Wrongs
Act 1958 (Vic), s 28I (five per cent); Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1941 (WA), s 5 (six per
cent); Personal Injuries (Liabilities and Damages) Act 2003 (NT), s 22 (five per cent).
See above the text accompanying n 51.
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(F)

The Resulting Statutory Chaos

As a result of the legislative reaction to the insurance crisis, Australia now has a spectacularly
complicated tort system. Each jurisdiction has a unique set of rules (which is a nightmare for
academics writing about the Australian law of torts, if such a thing still exists). And, within
each jurisdiction, it is common to find a litany of schemes that establish different rules for
different types of cases. For instance, in New South Wales the legislation enacted in the wake
of the Ipp Report added to statutes governing compensation in the contexts of motor vehicle
accidents71 and workers’ compensation.72 This ‘hodge-podge’73 of statutes is pregnant with
the potential to cause significant injustice. A claimant tortiously injured in, say, a motor
vehicle accident, may receive treatment altogether different from a claimant who suffers
identical loss due to the carelessness of a provider of a recreational service. Similarly, a
person hurt as a result of the wrongdoing of another in one State may recover several hundred
thousand dollars more or less than an identically injured person in another State. In short, tort
law in Australia is now chaotically fragmented both inter-jurisdictionally and intrajurisdictionally.

(G) The Impact of the Statutory Changes

Reliable data regarding the effect of the tort reforms on third-party insurance premiums are
not available74 (although anecdotal evidence suggests that premiums have returned
approximately to levels seen before the 2001-2002 insurance crisis). However, the impact of
71
72
73
74

Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW).
Workers Compensation Act 1987 (NSW).
The description is Ipp JA’s: Landon v Ferguson [2005] NSWCA 395; (2005) 64 NSWLR 131 at 135 [17].
Data regarding premiums were not systematically collected before the 2001-2002 insurance crisis. Since
2003, a national insurance database, the ‘National Claims and Policies Database’ has been maintained by the
Australian
Prudential
Regulation
Authority.
It
is
accessible
online:
<http://www.ncpd.apra.gov.au/Home/Home.aspx>.
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the changes made to the tort system in Australia in the wake of the Ipp Report is clearly
visible in the number of personal injury claims filed.75 It is convenient to look at the data for
the civil jurisdiction of the New South Wales District Court (New South Wales is the most
populous state in Australia, and the civil jurisdiction of its District Court, which is roughly
equivalent in institutional terms to the English County Court, deals almost exclusively with
personal injury cases). In 2001, filings were 20,784.76 This figure fell to 12,686 in 2002 and
then to 7,912 in 2003. In 2004, only 6,789 claims were filed.77 These are obviously very
profound changes.78 There is no doubt that they were due to the legislation enacted following
the Ipp Report.

(H) The Future

The statutory changes in Australia have, on the whole, been condemned by academics. 79
Many judges have been critical of them too. One prominent judge, now the Governor of
Tasmania, wrote that the reforms were ‘hasty and ill-considered reactions to the so-called
insurance crisis’.80 Justice Ipp complained that some of the statutory changes went too far and
suggested that they will probably be wound back, quietly and gradually. His Honour wrote: ‘It
is difficult to accept that public sentiment will allow all these changes to remain long-term
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77
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A detailed survey of these statistics in all jurisdictions is provided in EW Wright, ‘National Trends in
Personal Injury Litigation: Before and After “Ipp”’ (2006) 14 TLJ 233.
District Court of New South Wales, Annual Review 2003 at Annexure A1.
District Court of New South Wales, Annual Review 2004 at Annexure A1.
The personal injury Bar in New South Wales was decimated as a result. Many sets of barristers’ chambers
closed following the legislative reforms. The New South Wales government was even lobbied by the
profession to create a ‘rescue package’ for unemployed lawyers. This was wishful thinking: see A Mitchell,
‘Get Over It, Carr Tells Jobless Lawyers’ 7 December 2003, Sun Herald, 21.
Withering criticisms include NJ Mullany, ‘Tort Reform and the Damages Dilemma’ (2002) 25 UNSWLJ
876; H Luntz, ‘The Australian Picture’ (2004) 35 VUWLR 879; McDonald (2006), above n 54; A Field,
‘“There Must be a Better Way”: Personal Injuries Compensation since the “Crisis in Insurance”’ (2008) 13
Deakin LR 67.
P Underwood, ‘Is Ms Donoghue’s Snail in Mortal Peril?’ (2004) 12 TLJ 1 at 22.
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features of the law. Certain of the statutory barriers that plaintiffs now face are inordinately
high.’81
It seems reasonably likely that at least some of the more severe provisions will slowly be
softened or repealed as the insurance crisis fades from Australia’s political memory. One
interesting recent development, which may be a reaction to the harshness of the post-Ipp
reforms, is that context-specific no-fault compensation schemes are on the rise. For instance, a
no-fault system for persons catastrophically injured in motor vehicle accidents was quietly
established in New South Wales in 2006.82 The Federal Government recently briefed the
Australian Productivity Commission, an economic advisory body, to inquire into establishing
a disability care and support scheme.83 The Commission recommended that a national
comprehensive system be established to insulate persons from the financial consequences of
significant disability.84

(I)

Summary

In contrast with the glacial pace at which law reform typically occurs, all Australian
governments rapidly altered tort system at the start of the twenty-first century. These changes,
which primarily concerned the substantive law of torts (including its remedial system) rather
than the procedure by which it is administered, were severely restrictive of the ability of
claimants to recover compensation. They were made with a view to reducing insurance
premiums. Central to the reform process was a report, the Ipp Report, commissioned by the

81
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D Ipp, ‘The Metamorphosis of Slip and Fall’ (2007) 29 ABR 150 at 150.
Motor Accidents (Lifetime Care and Support) Act 2006 (NSW). This scheme operates in tandem with a faultbased system: see Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 (NSW).
The Terms of Reference are available online: <http://uat.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/disability-support/termsof-reference>.
Productivity Commission, Disability Care and Support (Melbourne: Productivity Commission, 2011). The
Commission’s report is available online: <http://www.pc.gov.au/projects/inquiry/disability-support/report>.

16

governments of Australia. The reforms resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of
filings of actions for damages in respect of personal injury and death.

III

THE YOUNG REPORT

This part of this article examines the Young Report. Comparisons will be drawn with the
Ipp Report and the tort reform process in Australia where appropriate.

(A) The Political Context

In order to properly understand the Young Report, it is essential to appreciate the political
environment in which it exists. The Conservatives commissioned the Young Report because
they (like the other major parties) believed that Britain was in the grip of a ‘compensation
culture’. Although a 2006 report by the House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee
concluded that there was no ‘compensation culture’ in Britain,85 in his Foreword to the
Young Report the Prime Minister claimed: ‘A damaging compensation culture has arisen, as if
people can absolve themselves from any personal responsibility for their own actions, with
the spectre of lawyers only too willing to pounce with a claim for damages on the slightest
pretext.’ This ungrammatical piece of rhetoric, which was not supported by any empirical
evidence to contradict the findings of the 2006 report, contains many phrases that are familiar
to Australian lawyers: ‘compensation culture’, ‘personal responsibility’ and the spectre of
‘greedy lawyers’. These catch-cries were ubiquitous in the Australian media in the period
preceding the publication of the Ipp Report.86

85

86

House of Commons Constitutional Affairs Committee, Compensation Culture: Third Report of Session 20052006, vol 1, HC 754-I (London: The Stationery Office, 2006) at 13 [31] (‘the evidence does not support the
view that increased litigation has created a “compensation culture”’).
See above Part II(B).
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Unfortunately, the difficulty that the Conservatives (and their Liberal Democrat partners)
have with the supposed ‘compensation culture’ is not entirely clear.87 They do not, apparently,
see it as objectionable on the ground that it places upwards pressure on insurance premiums.
They could not take issue with the ‘compensation culture’ on this basis since there is not an
insurance crisis in Britain.88 It is true that there has been some unease about recent premium
spikes in specific contexts, such as in relation to motor vehicle insurance.89 But there is no
doubt that the situation in Britain with respect to premiums is radically different from that
which existed in Australia in the period preceding the publication of the Ipp Report. Rather, it
seems that the main objection to the ‘compensation culture’ is that it provokes excessive
caution and encourages defensive practices.

(B)

The Terms of Reference

Lord Young’s terms of reference relevantly stated:90 ‘To investigate and report back to the
Prime Minister on the rise of the compensation culture over the last decade coupled with the
current low standing that health and safety legislation now enjoys and to suggest solutions.’
Two points are worth noting in this regard. First, Lord Young was permitted to consider the
entirety of the law of torts and, indeed, all other fields in so far as they relate to the
‘compensation culture’. His remit also allowed him to consider the causes of the
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Several reasons why politicians might find the ‘compensation culture’ to be problematic are canvassed in
R Mullender, ‘Blame Culture and Political Debate: Finding our way Through the Fog’ (2011) 27 PN 64.
Although the government has recently investigated insurance premiums several times: Department for Work
and Pensions, Review of Employers’ Liability Compulsory Insurance: Second Stage Report (London:
Department for Work and Pensions, 2003); Office of Fair Trading, Liability Insurance (London: Office of
Fair Trading, 2003); Better Regulation Task Force, Better Routes to Redress (London: Cabinet Office
Publications, 2004) at 6; Office of Fair Trading, The UK Liability Insurance Market (London: Office of Fair
Trading, 2005).
For example, between March 2010 and March 2011 premiums for young drivers were reported to have
increased by up to 64 per cent. For other drivers, the cost of cover rose by up to 40 per cent. See D Prosser,
‘How Motor Insurers Drove Premiums to an All-Time High’, 9 September 2011, The Independent, 33. See
further House of Commons Transport Committee, The Cost of Motor Insurance: Fourth Report of Session
2010–2011, vol I, HC 591 (London: The Stationery Office, 2011).
Young Report, Annex A.
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‘compensation culture’. The terms of reference issued to the Ipp Panel were quite different.91
The Ipp Panel, recall, was requested to consider only the action in negligence in so far as it
applied to personal injury and death. It was also forced to accept that tort law was the root of
the problem to be addressed. Secondly, the terms of reference required Lord Young to assume
that a ‘compensation culture’ exists. He was not briefed with the task of determining whether
there was in fact a ‘compensation culture’. Given the contentiousness of this issue, it is
regrettable that the terms of reference did not permit Lord Young to investigate whether
Britain in fact suffers from a ‘compensation culture’.

(C)

Lord Young

It is useful to briefly reflect on the significance of the fact that Lord Young, a Tory peer, was
assigned with responsibility for investigating the ‘compensation culture’ and identifying
means of addressing it. Lord Young qualified as a lawyer and practised for a brief period
early in his working life. He then left the law to pursue a career in business and then in
politics. He was a cabinet minister in the Thatcher Government and subsequently served in an
advisory capacity for the Conservatives. What, if anything, can be read into the fact that
Lord Young was requested to advise the government how to tackle the ‘compensation
culture’, rather than, say, the Law Commission? Arguably, it suggests the existence of a belief
on the part of the Conservatives that ‘compensation culture’ should be addressed in a
pragmatic way. The Prime Minister referred in his Foreword to the need for ‘common sense’
in the law. Economic factors, rather than wider considerations of justice, were also seen as
particularly significant. Again, the Prime Minister claimed that the relevant law was
bureaucratic and (in a mixed-metaphor) that businesses were being ‘drowned in red tape’.

91

See above Part II(B).
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Finally, the fact that Lord Young was briefed as opposed to the Law Commission suggests
that the Conservatives thought that the ‘compensation culture’ was a reasonably urgent
problem. The Law Commission typically takes two or three years to publish a final report
from the date that a project is referred to it. Presumably, the Conservatives were not prepared
to wait this long. If the foregoing interpretation of the Conservatives’ motives for briefing
Lord Young is correct, the Young Report shares a number of features in common with the
Ipp Report.92

(D) The Nature of the Young Report

The fact that the author of the Young Report is a politician is immediately obvious upon even
a cursory reading of it. It is replete with political slogans and written in emotive and often
ungrammatical language. The Report’s recommendations are generally vague and it is
difficult to determine precisely what changes are proposed. Indeed, it is at times unclear
whether a change to the law is even being recommended. The Report is almost devoid of
references to the case law or to legislation and it contains many tell-tale signs that its author
had a relatively poor understanding of the tort system (several of which will be noted when
the Report’s recommendations are discussed93). In these respects, the Young Report is
decidedly amateurish compared with the Ipp Report. The fact that changes to important parts
of tort law are being contemplated on the basis of the Young Report is, therefore, a cause for
alarm. Proposals for reform that are made without the benefit of a proper understanding of the
current state of the law run a significant risk of altering it for the worse.

92
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See above Part II(C).
See below Part II(F).
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(E)

The ‘Compensation Culture’94

The phrase ‘compensation culture’ is used in at least five ways in academic and lay writing
about the law. First, it may indicate that too many lawsuits are being commenced. 95 Secondly,
a ‘compensation culture’ may refer to a society in which damages awards are frequently
excessive relative to some benchmark, such as the gravity of the defendant’s wrongdoing or
the severity of the claimant’s injuries. Thirdly, the words ‘compensation culture’ may mean
that a substantial number of claims are fraudulent.96 Fourthly, a ‘compensation culture’ may
refer to an undesirable readiness of sections of the public or the public generally to seek legal
redress of their grievances.97 Fifthly, a ‘compensation culture’ may be a society in which legal
redress for injuries is too readily available.
A serious defect in the Young Report is that it does not identify the sense in which it uses
the term ‘compensation culture’. Consider the following passage in the Report:98
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A great deal has been written on the subject of the compensation culture: see, e.g., Atiyah, above n 27 at 4750, 138-143, 157-158; R Lewis, A Morris and K Oliphant, ‘Tort Personal Injury Claims Statistics: Is there a
Compensation Culture in the United Kingdom?’ (2006) 14 TLJ 158; A Morris, ‘Spiralling or Stabilising?
The Compensation Culture and Our Propensity to Claim Damages for Personal Injury’ (2007) 70 MLR 349;
Morris, above n 11; J Hand, ‘The Compensation Culture: Cliché or Cause for Concern?’ (2010) 37 JLS 569;
R Mullender, ‘Negligence Law and Blame Culture: A Critical Response to a Possible Problem’ (2006) 22 PN
2; Mullender, above n 87; HA Williams, ‘Compensation Culture: A Storm in a Coffee Cup’ (2011) 1 SSLR
1; K Williams, ‘State of Fear: Britain’s “Compensation Culture” Reviewed’ (2005) 25 LS 499.
Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, then the Lord Chief Justice, understood the phrase ‘compensation culture’
to bear this meaning when he gave evidence to the Constitutional Affairs Committee in 2005. When asked
whether a ‘compensation culture’ existed, Lord Phillips replied in the negative and referred to statistics
indicating that the number of claims had fallen in recent years: House of Commons Constitutional Affairs
Committee, Compensation Culture: Third Report of Session 2005-2006, vol 2, HC 754-II (London: The
Stationery Office, 2006) at Ev 1.
See, e.g., Lewis, Morris and Oliphant, above n 94 at 175 (the phrase ‘compensation culture’ ‘insinuates that a
significant proportion of claims are fraudulent, exaggerated or otherwise lacking in merit’).
See, eg., K Williams, above n 94 at 500 (‘The growth of a “compensation culture” implies an increased and
unreasonable willingness to seek legal redress when things go wrong’ (footnote omitted)); J Lowe,
J Broughton, B Gravelsons, C Hensman, J Rakow, M Malone, G Mitchell and S Shah, The Cost of
Compensation Culture (London: Faculty and Institute of Actuaries, 2002) at Section 2.1 (a ‘compensation
culture’ is a culture in which there is a ‘desire of individuals to sue somebody, having suffered as a result of
something which could have been avoided if the sued body had done their job properly’); Hand, above n 94
at 575-576 (in a ‘compensation culture’ ‘people are more likely to “blame and claim” or “have a go” rather
than display a reasonable level of stoicism’).
Young Report, Foreword by Lord Young.
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‘I believe that a “compensation culture” driven by litigation is at the heart of the
problems that so beset health and safety today. [In 2009] over 800,000 compensation
claims were made in the UK while stories of individuals suing their employers for
disproportionately large sums of money for personal injury claims, often for the most
trivial of reasons, are a regular feature in our newspapers.’
In this extract, Lord Young conflates at least three of the five identified meanings of the
phrase ‘compensation culture’. In referring to the number of lawsuits, he implies that there is
a ‘compensation culture’ in the first sense. He then uses the term in the second sense by
asserting that damages awards are disproportionate (he does not identify the criterion
according to which proportionality is assessed). Finally, he suggests that many claims are
frivolous and thereby alludes to the fourth (and perhaps also to the fifth) definition of a
‘compensation culture’. With respect, this situation is unsatisfactory. Before proposals for
addressing a putative problem with the law are made, proponents for change should identify
the suggested problem with reasonable precision. A failure to do so is prone to result in
changes being made that fail to hit their target.
Next observe that Lord Young fails to realise that, on some of these definitions, it is
impossible to ascertain whether a ‘compensation culture’ exists. He refers to the fact that over
800,000 claims for compensation were made in 2009. He evidently thought that this proves
that there are too many claims in Britain. What, however, is a non-excessive level of
claiming? No sensible answer can be given to this question. Asserting that 800,000 claims is
an excessive is neither more nor less defensible than asserting that 600,000 claims or a million
claims is excessive.
The difficulties with the Young Report’s analysis of the ‘compensation culture’ do not end
here. Incredibly, Lord Young vacillated on the issue of whether there is in fact a
‘compensation culture’. In the passage quoted above, Lord Young indicates that he believed
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that a ‘compensation culture’ exists. However, later in his Report he wrote that ‘[t]he problem
of the compensation culture prevalent in society today is ... one of perception rather than
reality’.99 It is also worth noting that the latter claim contradicts the terms of reference, which
required Lord Young to assume that Britain is labouring under a ‘compensation culture’.100

(F)

The Recommendations for Reform

Preceding sections dealt with the background and context of the Young Report. Attention will
now be turned to the recommendations that Lord Young made that are relevant to tort
lawyers.

(i)

Good Samaritans

According to Lord Young, the public believes that Good Samaritans are not infrequently held
liable when their conduct causes injury.101 To support this proposition, Lord Young referred
to advice given on radio and television shows to homeowners during the 2009-2010 Winter
that they should not clear snow in front of their homes as doing so might expose them to
liability to passersby who slip and fall. Lord Young accepted that this public perception of the
law is inaccurate.102 As every lawyer knows, the law treats Good Samaritans sympathetically
so as not to discourage altruism. The courts are reluctant to hold them liable in negligence103

99
100
101
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Young Report at 19.
See above Part III(B).
Young Report at 23.
Lord Young thought that the perception had arisen ‘largely because in the USA Good Samaritans are often
liable’. In reaching this conclusion, Lord Young fell prey to a familiar myth about tort law in the United
States. Good Samaritans generally enjoy greater protection from liability in the United States than they do in
Britain. In many jurisdictions in the United States, Good Samaritans have been conferred with immunity. See
DB Dobbs, The Law of Torts (St Paul MN: West Group, 2000) at 663-664. See also at 306-307, 339.
Authorities are collected in C Sappideen and P Vines (eds), Flemings the Law of Torts (Sydney: Law Book
Co/Thomson Reuters, 10th edn, 2011) at 136.
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(or find that they are guilty contributory negligence104 or that they assumed the risk of
injury105). However, Lord Young thought that it was important to give the public greater
confidence on this score. Accordingly, he recommended that it be clarified that ‘people will
not be held liable for any consequences due to well-intentioned voluntary acts on their
part.’106
Four points should be noted in this connection. First, the relevant law is already admirably
clear. Enacting legislation in this connection entails the risk of making it less certain.
Secondly, Lord Young thought that this recommendation, if implemented, would not change
the law. On this point, he was badly mistaken. At present, Good Samaritans are obliged to
take reasonable care for the safety of those to whom they owe a duty. Lord Young’s
recommendation, if adopted, would confer Good Samaritans with immunity for acts
performed in good faith, as has been done in many Australian jurisdictions.107 Thirdly, it is far
from clear that Good Samaritans should be granted immunity. If Good Samaritans are
bestowed with immunity, the only people who will be shielded from liability who are not
already protected from it are Good Samaritans who act with reckless disregard for the welfare
of others. It seems unlikely that that this is a sensible position for the law to adopt. Fourthly,
Lord Young failed to realise that the public’s misperception of the law regarding Good
Samaritans will not be corrected by reducing the law to statutory form. The fact of the matter
is that legislation is not read by the general public. The problem needs to be addressed by
targeting the cause of the public’s misperception, which is primarily misleading and
irresponsible media reporting.
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Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA); [1959] 3 All ER 225.
Haynes v Harwood [1935] 1 KB 146 (CA); Baker v TE Hopkins & Son Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 966 (CA); [1959]
3 All ER 225. The interests of Good Samaritans are promoted in various other ways. For instance, in order to
facilitate their compensation in the event that they are injured, their conduct is not usually treated as an
intervening cause: for detailed discussion see Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm at § 32.
Young Report at 23.
See above Part II(E).

24

(ii)

Advertising legal services

Today, the advertisement of personal injury litigation services by both lawyers and claims
management companies (‘CMCs’) is commonplace. In an attempt to curb the worst perceived
excesses of such advertising, the Blair Government created a special regulatory regime for
CMCs in Part 2 of the Compensation Act 2006 (UK).108 In general terms,109 this regime
requires CMCs to apply for authorisation before operating and to abide by a code of
conduct.110 This code states that their advertising must comply with general rules of
advertising published by various regulators. Furthermore, CMCs are banned from engaging in
‘high pressure selling’, cold calling, advertising in medical or public buildings without the
consent of the management of the facility or building, and offering immediate cash or similar
benefits as an inducement for making a claim.
The Young Report proposes that the advertising of personal injury litigation services be
further restricted (specifics regarding the appropriate additional restrictions were not given)111
on the ground that such advertising contributes to the ‘compensation culture’. The Young
Report’s logic in this connection is not without difficulty. For one thing, it is unclear whether
the advertising in question is behind the rise of the ‘compensation culture’.112 It has been
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Several Australian governments have also restricting the advertisement of personal injury litigation services:
see above Part II(E).
109
What follows here is an abbreviated description of this complex regulatory system. A full understanding of
this regime necessitates consideration not only of Pt 2 of the Compensation Act, but also of various
regulations and statutory orders made pursuant to Pt 2, including The Compensation (Claims Management
Services) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/3322), The Compensation (Regulated Claims Management Services)
Order 2006 (SI 2006/3319), and the Compensation (Exemptions) Order 2007 (SI 2007/209).
110
Ministry of Justice, Conduct of Authorised Persons Rules 2007 (London: Ministry of Justice, 2007). The code
is
accessible
online:
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/guidance/inspection-monitoring/claimsmanagement-regulation/conduct-of-authorised-persons-rules2007.pdf>.
111
Young Report at 20-21.
112
An empirical study of the effect of legal services advertising on the ‘compensation culture’ was undertaken
on behalf of the Government in 2006: Department for Constitutional Affairs, Effects of Advertising in
Respect of Compensation Claims for Personal Injuries (London: Millward Brown, 2006). This report
concluded that ‘no straightforward link has been identified’ between legal services advertising and the
‘compensation culture’ (at 3).
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permissible for lawyers to advertise their services since the mid 1980s.113 The ‘compensation
culture’ is, apparently, a much more recent phenomenon.114
The previous point aside, it is quite impossible for restricting or prohibiting legal services
advertising to ameliorate the ‘compensation culture’ on some meanings of this concept. 115 For
example, it was noted above that a ‘compensation culture’ may mean, and Lord Young in his
Report on occasion uses it to mean, a society in which that damages awards are frequently
excessive relative to some standard. Limited or banning advertising would do nothing to
reduce the quantum of awards. Advertising simply has no effect on the rules governing the
assessment of damages.
A further difficulty with Lord Young’s analysis in this connection is that no weight is
given to the disadvantages of restricting or prohibiting legal services advertising. There is
insufficient space available to consider comprehensively these drawbacks in this article.116 In
brief, however, restricting legal services advertising would arguably be undesirable for several
reasons. It may reduce the speed with which facts in issue in litigation are investigated with
adverse consequences for the accuracy of judicial determinations, limit consumer choice, raise
the costs to consumers of finding a lawyer, and reduce public knowledge of the law. It is
necessary for these and other considerations to be weighed before any action is taken to
restrict legal services advertising. Even if such advertising has contributed to the
‘compensation culture’ or has other unwanted consequences, it does not follow that it should
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An excellent discussion of the lifting of the ban on lawyer advertising is L Hill, Publicity Rules of the Legal
Professions Within the United Kingdom’ (2003) 20 Ariz J Int’l & Comp L 323, especially at 336-342. See
also J Lowe and F Stephen, ‘Deregulation and Professional Boundaries: Evidence from the English Legal
Profession’ (1997) 26 Business and Economic History 792.
One commentator’s research reveals that the term ‘compensation culture’ did not feature in the British media
until the mid 1990s: Hand above n 94 at 569.
Meanings attributed to the phrase ‘compensation culture’ are enumerated above in Part III(E).
An immense literature exists regarding the desirability of permitting lawyers to advertise. Contributions
include: G Hazard, R Pearce, J Stempel, ‘Why Lawyers Should be Allowed to Advertise: A Market Analysis
of Legal Services’ (1983) 58 NYULR 1084; M Walker, ‘Advertising by Lawyers: Some Pros and Cons’
(1979) 55 Chi-Kent L Rev 407; R Cebula, ‘Does Lawyer Advertising Adversely Influence the Image of
Lawyers in the United States? An Alternative Perspective and New Empirical Evidence’ (1998) 27 JLS 503;
Note, ‘Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession’s Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available’ (1972) 81
Yale LJ 1181.
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be banned or restricted. It may be that the adverse ramifications of legal services advertising
are worth tolerating.
Finally, it should be noted that the ability of the government to restrict legal services
advertising might be limited by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
which guarantees freedom of expression.117 The experience in the United States in this
connection is significant. In that country, lawyer advertising is constitutionally protected as a
form of ‘commercial speech’ under the First Amendment.118 Given the growing interest of
British courts in First Amendment jurisprudence119 and their tendency to strengthen the
protection given to freedom of expression, it is far from inconceivable that Article 10 would
put a brake on attempts to further restrict legal services advertising in this jurisdiction.120 This
possibility was not appreciated by Lord Young.
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Article 10(1) relevantly provides: ‘Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public
authority and regardless of frontiers.’
See especially Florida Bar v Went For It, Inc., 515 US 618 (1995). See further K Sullivan, ‘The Intersection
of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers’ First Amendment Rights’ (1998) 67
Fordham L Rev 569. Cf the constitutional position on legal services advertising in Australia: see above 63.
First Amendment jurisprudence was until relatively recently essentially ignored by British courts. References
are now made to it with some regularity: see, e.g., R (Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State
for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 1 AC 1312 at 1353 [47]; Douglas v Hello! Ltd (No 1)
[2001] QB 967 (CA) at 1004 [135]; Brown v Stott [2003] 1 AC 681 (PC) at 708; Reynolds v Times
Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) at 218.
Article 10(1) is qualified by art 10(2). This paragraph provides:
‘The exercise of [the freedoms guaranteed by art 10(1)], since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received
in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’
It seems doubtful whether such restrictions on legal services advertising are ‘necessary in a democratic
society’ (emphasis added). These words set the bar high. As Lord Bingham of Cornhill wrote in Regina
(Animal Defenders International v Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008]
1 AC 1312 at 1345 [26]:
‘For a restriction to be necessary there must be a pressing social need for it, and it is for the member
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(iii) Extension of the low-value road traffic claims procedure

The Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK)121 provide for a simplified claims procedure for lowvalue road accident personal injury claims.122 This procedure applies where the value of the
claim is between £1,000 and £10,000 and at least £1,000 is sought in respect of pain and
suffering. The streamlined procedure aims to expedite the processing of claims to which it
applies (it applies to approximately 75 per cent of road accident personal injury claims 123). It
also seeks, by way of a fixed costs regime, to keep costs in proportion to the value of the
claim. Lord Young proposed increasing the upper limit of claims that are subject to this
procedure to £25,000 and extending the procedure to medical negligence cases.124 This
proposal might be sensible, although one wonders whether bringing some higher-value and
therefore more complex claims within this streamlined system will result in injustice since
higher-value claims tend call for more detailed investigations. This point aside, however, it is
unclear whether this proposal will address the ‘compensation culture’. Indeed, if
implemented, it may increase the number of claims brought, the opposite of what Lord Young
hopes to achieve. This is because the faster claims are processed, the more attractive seeking
legal redress will become. Some people who would have been discouraged from claiming by
the time it would take for their claim to be processed will be more inclined to claim if they are
confident of obtaining an award more quickly.
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SI 1998/3132.
See, especially, Pt 8 and PD 8B (Pre-action Protocol for Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic
Accidents). See further Department for Constitutional Affairs, Case Track Limits and the Claims Process for
Personal Injury Claims, Consultation Paper 8 (London: Department for Constitutional Affairs, 2007);
Ministry of Justice, Low Value Personal Injury Claims in Road Traffic Accidents (London: Ministry of
Justice, 2009).
Ministry of Justice, Solving Disputes in the County Courts: Creating a Simpler, Quicker and More
Proportionate System, Consultation Paper 6 (2011) at 25-26 [76].
Young Report at 22-23.
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(iv) Success fees and ATE premiums

In December 2009, Sir Rupert Jackson, a Lord Justice of Appeal, published his review of
costs in civil litigation.125 Among the central recommendations that he made in his
voluminous report are that success fees (the fee to which a lawyer who acts on a conditional
fee agreement is entitled if the case is successful) and after-the-event (‘ATE’) insurance
premiums (ATE insurance is insurance secured by the claimant when a claim is brought
against the risk of having to bear the defendant’s costs) should cease to be recoverable as
costs. Sir Rupert’s hope is that, by giving claimants a stake in the costs, it is more likely that
costs will be more controlled than they are at present. In his Report, Lord Young urged the
government to act on these recommendations.126 Presumably, he thought that their
implementation might diminish the ‘compensation culture’. However, it is unclear whether
success fees and ATE insurance premiums are causally related to the ‘compensation culture’.
Both the use of conditional fee agreements and the availability of ATE insurance became
widespread in 2000.127 Yet the volume of claims remained essentially constant at this time.128
Accordingly, it is uncertain whether barring the recoverability of success fees or
ATE insurance premiums as costs will do anything to resolve the ‘compensation culture’, at
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Sir Rupert Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 2009)
(‘Jackson
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It
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online:
<http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/Resources/JCO/Documents/Reports/jackson-final-report-140110.pdf>.
The
Jackson Report is trenchantly criticised by K Oliphant et al, Working Group on Civil Litigation Costs: On A
Slippery Slope – A Response to the Jackson Report (2011). This reply to the Jackson Report is available
online: <http://ectil.org/oliphant/slippery-slope/>. See also R Lewis, ‘Litigation Costs and Before-the-Event
Insurance: The Key to Access to Justice?’ (2011) 74 MLR 272; A Zuckerman, ‘The Jackson Final Report on
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Young Report at 21-22.
Conditional fee agreements first appeared following the Conditional Fee Agreements Order 1995 (UK)
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Lewis, Morris and Oliphant, above n 94 at 171-172.
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least in so far as the idea of a ‘compensation culture’ is taken to mean a society in which too
many lawsuits are commenced.129

(v)

Referral fees

Personal injury solicitors have many of their clients referred to them by CMCs and insurers.
In return for referrals, solicitors pay a fee.130 The fee is roughly £800 per case referred.131 The
Jackson Report recommends that the payment of referral fees be banned,132 primarily on the
ground that cases are being referred to the solicitor who pays the highest fee rather than the
solicitor who is able to provide the best service to the client. Lord Young supported this
recommendation in his Report.133 He thought that implementing it would help to solve the
‘compensation culture’. This is not the place to comprehensively consider the merits of
permitting the payment of referral fees. There is insufficient space in which to do so.
However, it is worth noting that that the issue of referral fees draws in many of the
considerations that are in play in relation to advertising by lawyers. Indeed, referral fees are
essentially a fee paid by lawyers to have others advertise on their behalf. One of the strongest
arguments against prohibiting legal advertising is that banning it would reduce information
available to consumers about legal services and the law.134 The same argument militates
against prohibiting referral fees. Coherence may demand, therefore, that the position taken in
relation to advertising may affect what should be done in connection with referral fees and
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Various meanings attached to the phrase ‘compensation culture’ were discussed earlier: see above Part III(E).
Solicitors have been permitted to pay referral fees since an amendment to the Solicitors Conduct Rules in
2004. See D Greene, ‘The Referral Fee Conundrum’ (2010) 160 NLJ 419
D Budworth, M Costello and F Gibb, ‘Victory for Drivers in Insurance Scandal’, 9 September 2011, The
Times, 1.
Jackson Report at ch 20.
Young Report at 20-21.
See above Part III(F)(ii).
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vice versa. This does not seem to have been appreciated by the authors of either the
Jackson Report or the Young Report.

(vi) Summary

In general, the recommendations made in the Young Report are all ill-considered. Some of
them are based on a defective understanding about the current state of law, such as those
concerning Good Samaritans. Others, like that regarding the extension of the simplified
procedure for road traffic personal injury claims, might increase the volume of claims and
therefore aggravate the ‘compensation culture’. Yet others are supported only by emotive
slogans and clichés rather than reasoned analysis. The proposals regarding advertising, for
instance, do not suggest that any thought has been given to the merits of permitting lawyers to
advertise their services. They are essentially propped up only by sound bites. At the root of
many of these shortcomings in the Young Report is the failure of its author to identify clearly
what he means by ‘compensation culture’.

(G)

Implementation of the Young Report135

The stage is set for the implementation of the Young Report’s recommendations.
Responsibility for putting them into effect has fallen to the Department for Work and
Pensions136 and the Ministry of Justice.137 The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of
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A timetable to the implementation of the proposals in the Young Report is provided in Annex M.
The Department of Work and Pensions published a report on the implementation of the Young Report’s
recommendations in March 2011: Department of Work and Pensions, Common Sense, Common Safety –
Progress Report (London: Department of Work and Pensions, 2011). The report is available on the
Department’s website: <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/cscs-progress-may-11.pdf>.
Proposals to implement certain of the Young Report’s recommendations are detailed in Ministry of Justice,
above n 123.
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Offenders Bill,138 which was introduced by the government on 21 June 2011, contains
provisions that prohibit the recovery of success fees and ATE insurance premiums as costs in
most situations.139 On 9 September 2011, the Justice Minister announced plans to prohibit
referral fees.140
In March 2011, the Ministry of Justice published a consultation paper in which it indicated
the government’s support for Lord Young’s recommendation that the ceiling of the simplified
procedure applicable to road accident personal injury claims be raised from £10,000 to
£25,000 (this change would bring approximately 90 per cent of road accident claims within
this streamlined procedure).141 It also expressed the government’s agreement with
Lord Young’s proposal to extend the simplified procedure to medical negligence claims,
beginning with claims against the National Health Service. 142 Indeed, the Ministry revealed
that the government is contemplating going further than Lord Young in this connection in two
respects. First, it seems that the government is interested in bringing public liability and
employer’s liability claims within the simplified procedure’s net too.143 Secondly, the
government is contemplating a claims ceiling of £50,000 in all four contexts (in relation to
road accident claims, the government estimated that such an increase would result in
approximately 95 per cent of claims being processed pursuant to the streaming procedure.)144
Happily, it seems unlikely that Lord Young’s confused proposal concerning Good
Samaritans will not be put into effect. Shortly after the Young Report was published, the
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HC Bill 205 (2011).
See Pt 2 of the Bill.
Ministry of Justice, ‘Curbing Compensation Culture: Government to Ban Referral Fees’, Media Statement,
9 September 2011
<http://www.justice.gov.uk/news/press-releases/moj/newsrelease090911a.htm>.
On
13 September 2011 Jack Straw introduced a private members bill, the Motor Insurance Regulation Bill (HC
Bill 229), cl 1 of which prohibits referral fees.
Ministry of Justice, above n 123, 23 [66]-[69].
Ibid, 25 [74]-[76].
Ibid, 25-26 [77]-[82].
Ibid, 23-26 [66]-[82].
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Department of Transport published a ‘Snow Code’145 advising occupiers that they were very
unlikely to incur liability to pedestrians who slip and fall if they clear snow in front of their
house. It seems that the government regards this as sufficient to address the public’s
misconceptions regarding the responsibility in tort law of Good Samaritans.146
It remains to be seen whether Lord Young’s proposal concerning advertising by lawyers
will be implemented. The government seems to be less than enthusiastic about this
recommendation. Of course, even if the government regards the volume and type of
advertising as objectionable, it may feel that it is unnecessary to restrict or outlaw legal
services advertising on account of the ‘compensation culture’ if referral fees are banned. This
is because prohibiting referral fees would result in the disappearance of the CMC industry and
the extensive advertising in which that industry engages.

IV THE AUSTRALIAN AND BRITISH REFORM EXPERIENCES COMPARED

It is useful to reflect on some similarities and differences in the tort reform process in
Australia and Britain. There are several parallels between the processes that are worth noting.
First, in both jurisdictions, the reform process has been largely driven by stakeholders.
Governments, for the most part, merely reacted to lobbying. They did not act on their own
initiative. The major stakeholders are insurers and organisations representing claimant
lawyers. The positions taken by these stakeholders have been firmly entrenched. Neither has
been willing to give ground to the other. Secondly, governments in both Australia and Britain
have focused on economics and efficiency rather than on broader considerations of justice.
The politicians’ concentration on economics meant that their main concern has been with
cutting the cost of the tort system to society. The interest in achieving inter-personal justice
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the

Department’s

website:

between tortfeasors and victims has occupied little, if any, space in the minds of politicians.
Thirdly, in both Australia and Britain, the media played an influential role in the reform
process. It thrust the tort system into the public’s eye. By and large, it has been highly critical
of lawyers, the judiciary, and claimants. Reports of the tort system have generally been
grossly distorted. The manner in which it has been portrayed generally bears little
resemblance to reality. One of the most regrettable features of the reporting is that the
difference between a claim being brought and a claim succeeding has often been suppressed.
Accordingly, the impression has been created that claims that had little chance of succeeding
led to an award of damages.
Although the tort reform processes in Australian and Britain have much in common, there
are some significant differences between the Australian and British experiences in this regard.
Perhaps the most noteworthy difference concerns the location where insurers and lawyers
have clashed. In Australia, the war between these stakeholders took place in the law
governing liability and the assessment of damages. Unsurprisingly, therefore, this is where the
governments of Australia focused their attention. As described earlier,147 the reforms enacted
in the wake of the Ipp Report made establishing liability significantly harder in many cases
and severely restricted the damages to which successful claimants are entitled. Little thought
was given to the procedure by which tort law was administered. For example, barely an
eyebrow was raised about the fact that claimant personal injury lawyers in Australia, like their
counterparts in Britain, invariably work pursuant to conditional fee agreements. The
experience in Britain could hardly have been more different. The battle between insurers and
lawyers in Britain has been waged not over the law of liability or that concerning the
assessment of damages. Rather, the major campaigns have been fought in the realm of
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procedure. In particular, brutal battles have taken place in relation to costs.148 Because
attention in Britain has been focused nearly exclusively on the procedural system, the
substantive law of torts, including the law governing the assessment of damages, has largely
escaped legislative alteration (for the moment).
It is not easy to explain this profound difference in the tort reform process in Australian
and Britain (which so far seems to have gone unnoticed). Why have things unfolded so
differently in two countries the legal systems of which have so much in common? It is
conceivable that it is merely a historical accident.149 However, a more plausible explanation
has to do with differences in political ideology. Arguably, the idea of the Welfare State has
more attraction in Britain than in Australia. Consider, for example, the fact that the National
Health Service, the jewel in the crown of the British Welfare State, is regarded as sacrosanct
in England. In Australia, no such reverence is given to state-funded medical arrangements.
Indeed, in Australia, significant efforts have been made, primarily through a generous
premium rebate scheme,150 to encourage citizens to purchase private health insurance. The
latest statistics reveal that approximately 45 per cent of Australians have such insurance.151
Conversely, only around 6 per cent of adults Britain and Scotland have private health
insurance.152 This example gives some insight in the wildly different attitudes held in
Australia and Britain regarding state-run welfare arrangements, of which tort law is an
148
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example. This difference in views may go some way towards explaining why profound
reductions in the availability of tort compensation have been politically palatable in Australia
but have not even been seriously considered in Britain. British insurers are well aware that
there is less political resistance to modifying the procedure by which tort law is administered
in their favour. It is here, therefore, that they have sought to tilt the law in their favour.

V CONCLUSION

Tort reform swept across Australia following the 2001-2002 insurance crisis that occurred in
that country. These reforms severely curtailed the circumstances in which liability in tort
arises and the quantum of damages recoverable. In Britain, less extensive but nevertheless
important reforms are in the works. Change, it seems, is coming to Britain too. This article
has described the Australian reforms and those contemplated in Britain. The reform process in
both countries has been quite similar in certain respects. However, a major difference between
them is that the Australian reforms primarily concerned the law on liability and damages
whereas the changes presently being mooted in Britain are directed mainly at the procedural
regime by which tort law is administered. This difference may be attributable to Welfare State
ideology enjoying greater vitality in Britain than in Australia.
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